

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

Juliette Chung

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STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL SURVIVAL— SOCIAL DARWINISM AND CHINESE EUGENIC

*With savages, the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated; and those that survive commonly exhibit a vigorous state of health. We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed and the sick.... Thus the weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man. It is surprising how soon a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a domestic race; but excepting in the case of man himself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed... [But] there appears to be at least one check in steady action, namely the weaker and inferior members of society not marrying so freely as the sound; and this check might be indefinitely increased, though this more to be hoped for than expected, by the weak in body or mind refraining from marriage.—Charles Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 1871.¹*

Absorbing ideas of his cousin Francis Galton, Charles Darwin expressed a grave concern of paradoxical forces of natural selection affecting civilized nations. Natural selection initially promised the victory of Civilization over savages, and nevertheless left a moral dilemma of the acculturated sympathy to save undesirable elements and the pressing need for social intervention/selection in order to halt the appalling over-civilizing tendency of racial degeneration. Accordingly, Nature, in Darwin's evolutionary vision, played initially a driving force to bring about Civilization and was later superseded by Civilization. Nature and Civilization hence posed a dynamic binary and determined that certain races, nations, ethnicities and classes were more civilized than others, and hence justified their domination over the lesser ones.²

¹ See *The Descent of Man, And Selection in Relation to Sex*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 168-169. Mike Hawkings' *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945—Nature as model and Nature as Threat*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) also explores the paradoxical forces of nature and the eugenic conscience embedded in social Darwinism.

² Prasenjit Duara, "The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism," in *Journal of World History*, (2001), vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 99-130.

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

In 1883, Galton proposed his biometrics approach to objectively recognize the undesirable elements in a population and coined “eugenics” for the science or technology of human betterment through the application of genetic laws. The subsequent rise of the eugenic movement in the West in the turn of the 20th century, not only corresponded to the greater discursive practice of Civilization, but also engaged Darwin’s concern for social change and social control that gave rise to the two eugenics approaches: negative—reduce the number of the undesired, and positive—encourage the reproduction of the better elements. As the social Darwinian catchphrases “struggle for existence” and “survival of the fittest” (coined by Hubert Spencer) gained currency along with the globalization of science and technology, eugenics worked both ways for the dominated to measure up to superior Civilizational standards, and for the dominators to restrain tendencies of racial degeneration and maintain supremacy. Socio-political problems that derived from industrialization and their dysgenic impact on populations were the combating targets that launched the Western eugenics movements. But both Japanese and Chinese intellectuals, in their initial introduction of eugenics ideas, tried to measure up to Civilizational yardsticks, since both Japan and China had still only gone halfway in their search for wealth and power.³

When Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) brought up the topic of human improvement (*jinsbu kairyō*) in his newspaper-essay collection *Fukuzō hyakunwa* (One hundred essays of Mr. Fukuzawa) in 1896, he regarded the new advocacy of human application of animal breeding in the West, although as fantastical as aero-communication between Mars and the Earth, as a great inspiration for national strength, imperialist expansion and thus Civilizational progress. Fukuzawa considered the eugenic prospect of reproducing progeny, for instance, as moral as Sakyamuni, Confucius and Jesus Christ,

³ See E. Sydney Cawcours, "Industrialization and Technological Change, 1885-1920" in *The Cambridge History of Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), vol. 6, pp. 385-450. According to E. Sydney Cawcours's study of Japanese economic development, even though it is true that the growth of modern sectors of industry and

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

or as brilliant as Isaac Newton, or as respectable as the military leader Katô Kiyomasa (1562-1611), was a far more sensible solution to racial improvement than the historical precedent approached by the Mongolian emperor Khubilai Khan (1215-1294) when he conquered China proper. It is said that Khubilai Khan originally planned to weed out entirely millions of the perceived inferior Han Chinese in the South and replace them with the better variety from the North. Khubilai Khan finally withdrew his plan by accepting the remonstrance of his premier Yelü Chucai.

In contrast, the modern eugenic technology of selecting desirable features – such as skin color, beauty, intelligence, robustness, and even the size of head and arms – was in Fukuzawa's eyes much more pleasant and feasible than the disheartening outlook of infanticide or of wiping out the entire population. Hence, it deserved more intellectual investment for Civilizational progress (*bunmei shinpo*).⁴ The desire to enter the civilized world was felt even more acutely by Liang Qichao (1873-1929), whose intellectual weight in China was comparable to Fukuzawa's in Japan, and who was often acclaimed as the "Chinese Fukuzawa Yukichi." In addition to the lack of national consciousness and inability to participate in the nation-state community, Liang also held the savage practice of early marriage responsible for Chinese racial degeneration and their loss of dominance in the competitive evolutionary process, and hence keeping the Chinese from becoming fully civilized. Liang believed that the elimination of early marriage and family reform were the keys to halting the dysgenic cycle. As early marriage was used to demarcate the division between civilization and savagery, both China and Japan were almost on the same scale, falling behind the West and only slightly better than India. In a 1902 essay posted in the newspaper he himself ran, Liang tried to bring the issue of racial improvement and Civilizational progress to the attention of other intellectuals and the literate public. Given the fact that Japan had made tremendous efforts in

commerce accelerated in Japan after the Pacific War, these modern sectors were "still an infant nurtured by the traditional economy" from 1881 to 1913.

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

political reforms modeled after the Euro-American institutions and yet still fell behind in terms of Civilizational level (*wenming chengdu*), Liang exhorted his compatriots not to take lightly the issue of early marriage as a vile communal custom and its link to the survival of the whole nation.⁵ With the threat of Western imperialism, social Darwinism seemed to impose a national imperative for Japanese and Chinese intellectuals to import eugenics to East Asia as a cure for racial degeneration, and as a passport to enter the civilized world.

This paper analyzes the development of Chinese eugenics within the historical frame of two converging moments in the first and second Sino-Japanese Wars (1894-95 and 1931-45) and the ways in which eugenics set forth themes, such as the coinage of scientific terminology, national character, population quality and growth, war deployment, and the split signification of the fittest and the survivors between the Spencerian and eugenic views. Whereas Spencer affirmed "war" as an evolutionary mechanism, the eugenicists opposed it as dysgenic since the best stock tended to be put on the front lines and the worst tended to suffer least and prevail. In the first converging moment when both Japan and China were in the same struggle for Civilizational progress, Japan was a source of inspiration, mediation and emulation for Chinese eugenics development. However, Japan became the competitor after moving from the dominated to the dominator. Ironically, both Chinese and Japanese eugenicists defined the Sino-Japanese confrontation in the second converging moment as an evolutionary passage of becoming the fittest.

⁴ Fukuzawa Yukichi, in *Fukuzawa Yukichi shû* (Tokyo: Chikuma shobô, 1977), pp. 205-207.

⁵ Liang Qichao, "Jin zaohun yi" together with "Xinmin yi" in *Yinbing shi heji* (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1932), Wenji, vol. 3, pp. 104-114

Translating Chinese Eugenics

China from the 1898 Hundred Days Reform to its 1911 Revolution had undergone a radical transformation in which Japan provided peaceful technology transfer and helped Chinese modernization.⁶ The sudden thrust of Chinese importation of Japanese technology was promoted with the rhetoric of *dōbun* or *tongwen* (同文, same script or common civilization) by both Japanese and Chinese. For Japanese, supporting China to strengthen itself would in turn help Japan to resist Russia and the West. For Chinese, the Japanese aid would be the most convenient and available resource.⁷ While Chinese intellectuals employed *tongwen* as a rhetoric to encourage translation from the Japanese versions of Western Learning, they were fully aware of the asymmetrical relations of power and knowledge manifested in this cultural slope and emulation effort. In 1896, when Kang Youwei compiled *Riben shumu zhi* (A Bibliography of Japanese Books) to advocate the Japanese model of mastering Western technology in the Meiji era (1868-1912), he said in his preface,

It is the Way that the successor always excels the predecessor and very much so in the human world that those that come last occupy the higher posts. The West started their reform (*bian-fa*, transformation or revolution) at the time of Francis Bacon, and up to now, for five hundred years, they have succeeded in developing their technology (*i*, skill or craft). Japan has tried to emulate the West in the Meiji period and by now they have accomplished the development. Among reforming countries in the world only Russia and Japan can join with the world powers. Imitating the Russian model would not be as effective as the Japanese because not only is Japan geographically closer to us than is Russia, but also the Japanese language is similar to Chinese. By following the Japanese model, we are therefore able to achieve the transformation in three years. Since the Japanese have already briefly translated the essential parts of Western Learning, we can appropriate their translation. Using the West as an

⁶ Douglas R. Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912: The Xinheng Revolution and Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1993), Introduction, Conclusion and Chapter six, "Translations and Modern Terminology."

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

ox and Japan as the farmer, we can sit and enjoy the harvest. Without spending thousands of dollars, we are going to get all the important books.⁸

Ultimately, importing Japanese knowledge of Western Learning, according to Kang, was to avoid repeating painful historical experiences, namely, the humiliating war indemnity and cession of Taiwan after the first Sino-Japanese War.

In 1897, one year after Kang's compilation of *Riben shumu zhi*, Kang's disciple Liang Qichao compiled *Xixue shumu biao* (A Bibliography of Western Learning), in which he included 300 or so volumes of the Jesuits' works, the missionaries' translation of, and Chinese scholars' writing about, Western Learning, and his own commentary on some of the books and the right way to study each discipline. He said in his preface, "According to military tactics, if we know ourselves and our enemies well, we fight one hundred battles and win them all...If we want to strengthen our country, we should translate Western books. If scholars want to establish themselves, it is effective to study Western books. Selectively reading the essential parts of these 300 volumes, we can roughly grasp the changes of the world."

In 1896, the Tong Wen Guan at Beijing established a Japanese language department (*Dongwen guan*), and the next year, Kang and Liang set up a private translation publishing office in Shanghai to prioritize Japanese translation of Western works on constitutional reforms in order to prepare for and precipitate governmental reform.⁹ In 1898, Zhang Zhidong advocated eloquently in *Quanxue pian* (Exhortation of learning) the importation of Japanese translation of Western Learning for its pre-elimination of Christianity, and Japanese-language learning for its swift efficiency

⁸ Kang's *Riben shumu zhi*, p. 4.

⁹ Tan Ruqian, p. 58.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

especially for those middle-aged bureaucrats. And for those young teens who were on their way to officialdom, they should focus their study on Western languages and translation.¹⁰

The call for translating from Japanese translation, as a more efficient way of obtaining Western knowledge and technology, was echoed by other provincial governors and highly ranked officials like Liu Kunyi (1830-1902), Wang Zhichun, Zhang Jian (1853-1926) and Zhang Baixi (1847-1907) in the Late Qing, not to mention those anti-Qing revolutionaries who either studied in Japan or learned about the Western revolutions through Japanese translation.¹¹ The so called "efficiency" of translating Japanese as opposed to European languages, according to Liang Qichao's shortcut experience, was to remove Japanese particles and conjugation out of the text, and reverse the grammatical position of subjects and verbs.¹² Since Liang's Japanese was very limited, his assertion of free flow of reversibility was based on the assumption of Japanese and literary Chinese being two immobile unitary entities. However, this assumption was challenged ironically by Liang himself and his mentor on Japanese affairs, Huang Zunxian, when they both, by following the Japanese example, advocated the primacy of vernacular writing and the use of phonetic symbols in order to spread literacy among the general populace through the medium of the press.¹³ While the linguistic medium of popular communication underwent a transition from literary to vernacular Chinese (1896-1919), the shortcut translating of the Japanese version of Western Learning began to get a bad name for its vulgarity and awkwardness, since Japanese itself had been through changes of writing style, and

¹⁰ Zhan Zhidong, *Quanzue pian*, section five, "On Translation" (*Guangyi*) and section two, "On Overseas Studies" (*Youxue*).

¹¹ Tan Ruqian, p. 59.

¹² Liang Qichao, "Lunxue ribenwen zhiyi" in *Yinbinshi wenqi leibian*, vol. I, pp. 718-720. This article was written in 1899.

¹³ Liang Qichao, "Shenshi yinshu xu" in *Yinbinshi wenqi leibian*, vol. II, pp. 1-2. In this article of 1896, Liang quoted Huang Zunxian's idea expressed in *Riben guozhi* (Japanese Gazette). In July of the same year, Liang and Huang together established *Shiwu Bao* (Contemporary Affairs, a ten-day periodical). See Liang's *Nianpu*, p. 31. And in his article of "Bianfa tongyi" of 1896, he expressed the same idea as well; see vol. I, p. 54.

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

removing the Japanese syllabaries (*kana*) no longer automatically translated into any readable Chinese.¹⁴

Against the current of massive importation of Japanese translation, Yan Fu (1853-1921) determined in 1895 to throw himself into the translation effort in order to search the secret of Western wealth and power.¹⁵ Upholding the translational yardsticks of “fidelity, clarity and elegance” (*xin, da, ya*), Yan Fu published eight translation works, *Tianyan lun* (T. H. Huxley’s *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays*), *Mule mingxue* (J. Stuart Mill’s *System of Logic*), *Qunxue siyan* (H. Spencer’s *Study of Sociology*), *Qunji quanjie lun* (J. Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty*), *Yuan fu* (Adam Smith’s *Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations*), *Fa yi* (C. D. S. Montesquieu’s *Spirit of Law*), *Shehui tongquan* (Edward Jenks’ *History of Politics*), *Mingxue qianshuo* (W. S. Jevons’ *Logic*) and *Zhongguo jiaoyu yi* (Alfred Westharp’s “View on Chinese Education”) from 1899 to 1914, despite the fact that Japanese translations of some of the same works were available then.

Since Yan Fu’s coinage of new terms was accurately perceptive and his works were always highly respected as the best model in the Chinese history of translation, one might be intrigued as to why his coinage was outcompeted by the Japanese version. For example, his coinage of “evolution” as *yanhua* 演化 is more accurate than the Japanese version 進化, because 演化 comprised both 進化 (progressive transformation) and 退化 (degeneration). And 演化 connotes the process of evolution

¹⁴ A case in point was shown by Sanetō Keishū in that a renowned biology professor with an enviable Ph. D. degree from a prestigious Euro-American institution published a popular biology textbook, but it turned out that he merely translated from a Japanese work and since he did not know any Japanese he simply removed all the syllabaries. One can expect many kinds of possible mistakes in this kind of work, the most serious one being with the negative expression. See Sanetō’s *Riben wenhua ge zhongguo de yingxiang* (the Influence of Japanese Culture in China, and the original title *Nihon bunka no Shina e no eikyō*, Tokyo, 1940), translated by Zhang Mingsan (Shanghai: Xinhshenbao guan, 1944), pp. 11-12, in which Sanetō also complained that Chinese plagiarism of Japanese works and translation was a common phenomenon.

¹⁵ See Yan Fu’s *Nianpu* (Chronological biography), collected in *Houguan yanshi congke*, in the series *Jindai zhongguo shiliao congkan xubian*, vol. 18 (Taipei: Wenhai, 1975). And also see his correspondence with Liang Qichao in *Yan Fu sixiang zhitan*, HongKong: Dadong, 1980, pp. 153-159, and Liang’s *Yinbinshi wenqi leibian*, vol. 1. And most importantly, see Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power—Yen Fu and the West*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964) for a detailed analysis of Yan’s annotated translation of these western works.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

as a ramification from simplicity to complexity rather than a unilinear or stage-bound progress. However, the term 進化 was predominately popular in Japan and was later accepted in China. It may similarly appear odd that few Chinese followed either his path of translating Western works directly or his translational approach, in which he used exquisitely-trained classical Chinese, and half extracted the important points and half translated the works. I would like to provide three explanatory elements to grapple with this particular perplexity. First, Yan Fu persisted in his literary esthetics and the principle that it is the readers' responsibility to acquire the knowledge of all his allusions from the classics. In his response to Liang Qichao's criticism of his using too abstruse and archaic language in the newly published translation work *Yuan fu* in 1902, he uncompromisingly said that he was proceeding appropriately and in the way that people had proceed before. "If I obtrusively translate those Western terms without alluding to antecedent institutions and names, can they all be understood? If I merely make up some vulgarism for the sake of ignorant villagers, we would witness destructive instead of revolutionary effects in our realm of literature."¹⁶

As for the second element, it is closely related to the first one. The inevitable generation gap and the different language training between the aforementioned middle-aged bureaucrats and the young teens constituted an ever-increasing distance of linguistic identities. As the former maintained the assumption of "shortcut" translational device between Japanese and literary Chinese, their writing was ironically influenced by the Japanese style.¹⁷ And as for the latter, who focused on learning European languages or were sent overseas by the government while young, they normally did not have a good command of literary Chinese and quite often they were not able to translate

¹⁶ See his correspondence with Liang Qichao in the collection and annotation of Yan's articles and poetry, *Yan Fu sixiang zhitan*, pp. 153-159.

¹⁷ Sanetô's analysis found that the so-called Liang Qichao's style, which was popularly imitated, was actually a Japanized style, and Japanization was even better received after the Literary Reform (1915-1920's). See Sanetô's *Riben wenhua ge zhongguo de yingxiang*, pp. 16-21. It is better to consult Sanetô's Japanese original because Zhang's translation of Sanetô's work provided only an abridgment of the analysis.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

directly from the European works without consulting a Japanese translation for the terminology and expressions. Yan Fu did not fall into either age/lingual-group and was probably the only one proficient in both cultural resources; therefore, if his own generation commented that his language was difficult, the later ones would feel so even more. Cai Yuanpei (1876-1940) remarked in 1923 that even though Yan Fu's translation was the best in fifty years and was well received by his contemporaries, his works were hard to understand by the common folk at this point of time.¹⁸

The third element would be more of social milieu. Ever since the *Zongli geguo shiwu yamen* adopted in 1898 the Japanese proposal of sponsoring 200 Chinese students' education in Japan, the number of both officially sponsored and privately funded students increased rapidly and once was said to surge up to 20,000 just after the abolition of the civil-service examination system in 1905. From 1901 to 1906, the number of Chinese students in Japan surpassed the total of students from all European countries.¹⁹ It fluctuated later and declined after the May Fourth movement of 1919, the students' demonstration against the decision of the Versailles Peace Conference with respect to the Shandong peninsula. With a new nationalistic interest to know the enemy better, the figure rose up again to 8000 in 1935 when Chinese silver dollars appreciated to a value three times higher than in the previous decade. But soon in 1937 all Chinese students returned home when China declared war against Japanese aggression in the Marco Polo Bridge incident (Japanese "China Incident".)

In addition to the flourishing establishment of schools for Chinese students in Japan, Japanese teachers were sent to China to help set up schools and to expand Japanese cultural influences. Between 1900 and 1907, Japanese faculty and experts monopolized most of the positions for foreigners.²⁰ This monopoly was challenged only after 1908, when the United States

¹⁸ See Cai's "Wushi nianlai zhongguo zhi zhixue" (Chinese philosophy in the last fifty years) in *Cai Yuanpei quianji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), vol. 4, pp. 351-382.

¹⁹ Sanetō Keishū, *Chūgokujin nihon ryūgakushi*, Tokyo: Kuroshio, 1960, chapter two.

²⁰ *Ibid.* the Japanese faculty occupied 84% of the foreign positions in China then.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

decided to return its share of the Boxer indemnity to improve Chinese higher education and to prepare Chinese students for overseas studies in the USA.²¹ It then declined annually, and from 1936 on no Japanese stayed, and the positions of foreign experts in the Chinese educational system was totally taken over by Euro-Americans.

However, before the decline, Japanese teachers in China and Chinese students in Japan together contributed to the extension of Japanese cultural-educational domination via the activities of translation and using by Chinese translations from Japanese translations or original works from Japan as the textbooks at the general schools or the Japanese schools in China. According to Sanetô Keishû, these Chinese students set up several translation workshops such as *Yishu huibianshe* (譯書彙編社, 1900, translating mainly Japanese university textbooks), *Jiaokeshu yijishe* (教科書譯輯社, ca. 1902, for secondary-school textbooks), the more politically inclined *Hunan bianyishe* (湖南編譯社, 1903, for any books or articles related to China as a topic) and *Minxuehui* (閩學會, 1904, mostly social-science focused), as well as other journals carrying current-events articles with massive amounts of translated quotations from Japanese sources. From 1901 to 1904, out of a total of 533 translation works 60% were translated from Japanese originals and translations.²² Although this supremacy of knowledge importation declined with the introduction of Euro-American and Russian elements, Japanese sources in a total of 1866 works still surpassed any other country in the Republican period of 1912-1940.²³ Among these translation works, 523 (28%) fell into the category of natural science and technology, which was second to the social-sciences

²¹ One may expect that an immediate effect of this decision would be to relax Chinese animosity toward Americans in general and American missionaries in particular.

²² *Chûgokujin nihon ryûgakushi*, chapter five.

²³ In his Table 24, of Chinese translation from various languages (1912-1940), Tan Ruqian lumps Anglo-American together as English sources and puts their total of 2988 in the first place, and Japanese 1866, as second. However, as was well known and often complained about, Chinese translators plagiarized Japanese translations of Western works without mentioning the name of Japanese translators, so we can expect that the figure of Japanese-source translations should in fact be higher than 1866. In addition, if we divide them by country, Japan would be in the first place. See his *Zhongguo yi riben shu zonghe mulu*, p. 73.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

section (687). This enormous quantity and ever-changing novelty of market demand would not be satisfied by Yan Fu's elitist approach. In the eyes of Fu Sinian (1896-1950), the second generation of the May Fourth reformers, the quality of these science translations was even ranked higher than Yan Fu's.²⁴

Looming on the horizon of influx of Japanese translation of scientific terminology, the Japanese presence in modern Chinese history served as an other for national self-identification and disidentification which functioned as a transparent bridge linking the old and the new, traditions and modernities, familiar and unfamiliar. Cultural experience as such can be articulated specifically through a trace of name changes for eugenics ideas in the linguistically interlocked context. Eugenic ideas were brought into Japan by Fukuzawa Yukichi when he mentioned Francis Galton's *Hereditary Genius* in the *Jiji Shōgen* (Comment on Current Affairs) in 1881. Fukuzawa appropriated Galton's views on hereditary human faculties in order to save the ex-samurai class from decline after the Meiji Ishin. Fukuzawa also made a couple of speeches on genetics and human improvement (*jinsbu kairyō*, 人種改良) in 1896.²⁵ Fukuzawa's eugenics approach was further developed by his disciple Takahashi Yoshio, who proposed a theory of white and yellow interbreeding in an article, "Nihon jinsbu kairyō ron" (The theory of improvement of the Japanese Race), in 1884. Takahashi's proposal of interbreeding was contested in 1886 by Katō Hiroyuki, who introduced and wrote about evolutionary theory. In 1905, the first issue of the journal *Jinsei* (Human Nature) published a Japanese translation of C. O. Whitman's article "The Heredity of Mental Power," in which Galton's ideas were further introduced. In 1910, Kōtoku Un'no's *Nihon jinsbu kairyō ron* (The Improvement of the Japanese Race) appeared; it is regarded as the first comprehensive Japanese-language treatment

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

²⁵ These speeches were collected in *Fukuō hyakuwa* (One hundred essays of Mr. Fukuzawa), see Suzuki Zenji, "Geneticists and the Eugenics Movement in Japan," in *Japanese Studies in the History of Science*, (1975) vol. 14, p. 157.

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

of eugenics.²⁶ As eugenics ideas were imported collaterally with Social Darwinism, the Japanese intellectuals appealed to them as a means of *fukoku kyōhei* 富國強兵 (enriching one's country and strengthening military buildup) in a perilous time of international competition.

For comparison with the Japanese context, before Yan Fu translated Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* (*Tiānyān lùn*), where eugenics was mentioned as a means of improving racial stock even though Huxley disapproved its use for humans, Kang Youwei had already advocated in the *Datong shu* (The Great Unity) around 1885-90 that prenatal care and women's education on the one hand, and sterilization on the other hand, were the appropriate techniques for human selection.²⁷ Although the *Datong shu* was not published until 1935, Kang's eugenics proposal was recorded by his disciple Liang Qichao in *Kang Nanhai zhuan* (Biography of Kang Yourwei), which was first published in 1906. In the *Datongshu*, Kang also advocated racial intermarriage in the hope of whitening the Chinese people. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact time when Kang acquired these ideas, and since he did not acknowledge his source of information, it is not easy to locate where he actually got his eugenics ideas. However, according to Kang's autobiography, he had been interested in Japanese reform and modernization since 1886. In 1896, after ten years of collection and reading, he compiled with his eldest daughter's help a bibliography of Japanese books (*Riben shumu zhi*), in which he included books on biological and social evolution and hygiene, and Katō Hiroyuki's speeches.²⁸ Moreover, several works of Katō Hiroyuki, and books on biology and medical studies with respect to prenatal care, women's hygiene, tuberculosis prevention, obstetrics and venereal disease were translated into

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

²⁷ In Liang Qichao's *Kang Nanhai zhuan* (Biography of Kang Yourwei), (Shanghai: Guangzhi shuju, 1906), pp. 31-32.

²⁸ See *Riben shumu zhi*, in the *Collection of Kang's Works* (*Kang Nanhai xiansheng yizhu hukan*), vol. 11, p. 62, p. 200, pp. 8-9, p. 558.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

Chinese before 1911.²⁹ Therefore, I suspect that Kang was not completely ignorant of Japanese eugenics knowledge.

In contrast to Kang Youwei's proposal, Liang Qichao suggested in 1902 a prohibition of early marriage, for five reasons: 1) it is harmful to health, because of an immature physical condition; 2) it is harmful to offspring because, according to statistics of the Western countries, the feeble-minded and retarded, and criminals, were mostly the product of early marriages; 3) it is harmful in nurturing the children because the parents are not experienced and educated enough to provide a proper family discipline; 4) it is harmful to education because parents would not be able to finish their studies; and 5) it is harmful to the national economy because the younger parents need financial support from their own parents. What Liang was concerned with in this proposal was damage to people involved in early marriage and its subsequent weakness in human resources devastating a fledgling national economy under the threat of imperialist encroachment.³⁰

During the decades of the 1900s and 1910s, there had been a variety of names for eugenic ideas such as "*jinnri kairyō gaku*, 人類改良学," "*jinsbu kaizō ron*, 人種改造論," "*minshū kaizen gaku*, 民種改善学," or "*yūsei ron*, 優性論" dispersed in various kinds of Japanese publication. In 1919 a new name, "*yūseigaku*, 優生学" (literally science of superior birth), emerged in Okaasa Jirō's *Saishin iden ron* (Modern genetics), and coexisted for a period with racial hygiene (*minzoku eisei*, 民族衛生). However, it was accepted as the stabilized term for eugenics in Japan when two major journals 優生学 (Eugenics) and 優生運動 (Eugenics Movement) gained popularities and was subsequently exported to China.³¹ Around the same time in China, there were a few names like "*shanzhongxue*,

²⁹ See Tan Ruqian's bibliography, *Zhongguo yi riben zonghe mulu* (Hongkong: Zhongwen daxue, 1980).

³⁰ Wu Shenyuan, *Zhongguo renkou sixiang shigao* (A history of Chinese population thought) (Zongqing: Xinhua shudian, 1986), pp. 269-71.

³¹ Suzuki Zenji, *Nihon no yūseigaku—so no shisō to undō no kiseki* (Japanese eugenics: its ideas and locus of movement) (Tokyo: Sankyo, 1983), pp. 76-77. And for its export to China, see Gao Mingkai's *Hanyu wailaicidian* (A dictionary of loan words) (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu, 1984), p. 394.

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

善種學” “*shuzhongxue*, 淑種學,” “*hunyin zhesixue*, 婚姻哲嗣學,” and “*renzhong gailiangxue*, 人種改良學” circulated in China. Among these names, “人種改良學” was the most stable term for eugenics, since it was included in the well-received *Dongwuxue dacidian* 動物學大辭典 (Zoology dictionary) edited by Du Yaquan (1873-1933, the director of the science translation department in the Commercial Press and the chief editor of the *Eastern Miscellany* and also editor of a botany dictionary in 1917) and published in 1922 by the Commercial Press. According to the entry definition, 人種改良學 (eugenics) was defined as a branch of zoology which employed approaches of political controls and social hygiene to investigate various causes and effects in the aims at racial improvement.³²

This dictionary definition, in terms of form and content, was not very satisfying in the eyes of the Chinese eugenicist Pan Guangdang when he introduced the term “優生” for eugenics and established the Chinese eugenics association in 1924. Pan argued that the term “*yousheng* 優生” used by the Japanese Eugenics Association and for its organizational journal was more appropriate than the above names and other names such as “人藝學” (*renyixue*, viriculture or hominiculture) and “種藝學” (*zhongyixue*, stirpiculture) respectively coined by Galton in 1873 and 1876, and other terms “人種衛生” (*renzhong weisheng*, Rassenhygiene), “人種生物學” (*renzhong shengwuxue*, Rassenbiologie), and “家族人類學” (*jiazurenleixue*, Familienanthropologie) popular in Germany and Scandinavia, since it was phonetically and semantically closer to the original English word coined by Francis Galton in 1883. Most importantly, Pan considered that it could avoid the confusion which had arisen from the problematical word “種” (J. *shu* or *tane*, C. *zhong*) which had two implications, that is, the anthropological understanding of “race” and the biological sense of “seed” as “germplasm” or as said in “born with good seed, 誕降嘉種” in the *Book of Poetry (Shijing)*. Pan argued that the

³² Du Yaquan ed., *Dongwuxue dacidian* 動物學大辭典 (Zoology dictionary), (Shanghai: the Commercial Press, 1922), p. 19.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

anthropological category of “race” was not yet scientifically substantiated and eugenics as a newly established discipline which only had a short history of fifty years should not become entangled with the dubious claim of superior race. Since every “color” of people fairly shared both good or bad germplasm distributed in its own population, Pan concluded that the application of eugenics should be aimed to track down the hereditary traits of human character and their appropriate mechanisms for cultural selection in order to uncover a better way of reproduction for human progress.³³

In view of the chaotic confusion of eugenic ideas developed earlier in the West, Pan expected that eugenics as a relatively new subject in China could depart from such a path of development. To serve this purpose, Pan established in 1924 a demarcation of eugenics (*youshengxue*, 優生學) specifically and exclusively to the extent that it looks like a manifesto: “It is not free love (*feiziyou lianai*, 非自由戀愛); it is not sexual education (*feixing jiaoyu*, 非性教育); it is not public hygiene (*fei gongzhong weisheng*, 非公眾衛生); it is not experimental marriage (*fei shiyan bunyin*, 非試驗婚姻); it is not a movement of anti-prostitution (*fei jinchang yundong*, 非禁娼運動); it is not prenatal care and teaching (*fei taijiao*, 非胎教); it is not research on physical education (*fei tiyu yanjiu*, 非體育研究); it is not compulsory marriage under the State’s mandate; it does not advocate a massacre of the weak, the unruly and inferior (*bu tulu wanruo*, 不屠戮頑弱); it does not aim to reproduce superman (*bu fanshi chaoren*, 不繁殖超人); it does not aim to reproduce genius (*bu shengchang tiancai*, 不生產天才) to supply for the society’s need; it does not aim to eliminate romanticism in love; it does not advocate animal breeding as a model for human rearing; it does not turn against any sensible concepts from sexual morality, marriage, love, family, reproduction and childrearing.”³⁴

³³ Pan Guangdan, “Yousheng gailun (General discussion on eugenics),” in Pan’s *Collection* (*Pan Guangdan wenji*) (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 1993), vol. 1, pp. 250-265.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

In addition to this manifesto-like demarcation, Pan also identified the most eligible eugenic social elements, that is, the average and slightly above-average standard of intelligence, robust physique, moral decency and reproductivity, which often conformed to the upper-middle class. Although eugenics was not aimed at the reproduction of genius or uniform personality, it nonetheless targeted on germplasm improvement in health, susceptibility to epidemic diseases, elimination of physical and temperamental defectiveness, creativity, resilience to external stimulation, sensational receptivity, intelligence and social coordination. Pan alerted his Chinese readers that eugenics should not be propagated as a magic bullet (*ruyidan*, 如意丹), by giving two considerations: 1) eugenic studies were still in the preliminary stage of data collecting and theory testing, and had not yet reached any conclusive results; 2) the germplasm improvement was limited and only in the relative sense that it could be selected only through the surviving quantity.³⁵

The term eugenics/*youshengxue* 優生學 was officially stabilized in the list of *Sociology Terminology* (*Shehuixue mingci*, 社會學名詞) as part of the register project of scientific terminology *Kexue mingci huibian* 科學名詞彙編. The list of *Sociology Terminology* was compiled by a group of Chinese sociologists among whom Pan was one of the committee members, and sponsored by the National Translation Bureau since 1937, and finally promulgated by the Ministry of Education in 1941. However, despite all the efforts at stabilizing the name, the signifier 優生 or eugenic rhetoric as it developed in China and Japan derived manifold elusive signification, and some of these variants being ironically against what Pan demarcated.

National Character and the Eugenicists' Representation

³⁵ Ibid.

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

Although Japanese genetics study was based on Mendelism, Japanese geneticists were cautious in applying it to human genetics. In China, Chinese geneticists were even more cautious in using Mendelism and merely appropriated it for animal and plant breeding. An implied reasoning for this cautiousness was that, according to Mendelism, characters were visualized as units transmitted independent of growth, and therefore newly acquired somatic modifications could not be transmitted to the succeeding generations. If Mendelism was applied thoroughly to human beings, there would never be a possibility of racial improvement without preventing the procreation of the unfit, according to the Mendelian law of segregation.

In this case, Japanese and Chinese, seen as "inferior" in the eyes of social Darwinians in the West, would not become "fit" unless they kept interbreeding for centuries with the claimed "superior" white races. Ideally, if they were able to implement white-yellow intermarriage successfully and continued breeding extensively without crossing back, what sense would it make to constitute a distinctive "Japanese" or "Chinese" race as opposed to the other races after a couple of generations? Becoming fit while remaining "Japanese" or "Chinese" was a challenging dilemma—a parallel to the modernization dilemma of "how to become modern while not losing an identity"—which the Japanese and Chinese eugenicists needed to wrestle with. This dilemma was implanted when the ideas of racial improvement were initially introduced into the East, as exemplified by Katô Hiroyuki's critique of Takahashi Yoshio's proposition of the yellow-white intermarriage. The eugenicists had to redefine a racial hierarchy and situate Japanese and Chinese genetic traits and determine their fit and unfit characters within the domain of national body before they could bring up any specific eugenic solutions.

In this section, I argue that Lamarckian ideas did play an important role in different ways in the eugenics movements in Japan and China, since Lamarckism offered a more humane alternative to the depressing aspect of Mendelism and provided a foundation for the wishful belief that

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

evolution was necessarily progressive. Ideologically, the idea of Lamarck's tenet that somatic modifications acquired from an organism's development of particular habits would pass on to the offspring under appropriate conditions, sustained a prospect of improving the human race through social reform and suggested that an improved environment would produce better people. Because none of the critics and advocates discussed in this section were Lamarckian biologists in a strict sense, the discussion considers Lamarckism as a series of ideas emphasizing environmental factors and thereby could be applied as a social-control project under Jean-Baptiste Lamarck's tenet of inheritance of acquired characters.³⁶

The discourse on national character which arose in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries not only portrayed the uniqueness of one's country, but also justified Western imperialist expansion by taking the representational advantage of subjecting power over the depicted object. Through translational practice, this national-character discourse was imported to China and Japan at the end of 19th century. Intriguingly enough, whereas the Chinese deployed this discourse of self-knowledge into self-criticism to reconfirm unintentionally what had been represented by the West and later by Japan, the Japanese thoroughly embraced both sides of subject/object or self/other positionings. On the one hand, they overturned how Japan was represented in the production of Western Orientalism. On the other hand, they took the same type of advantage over other nations like China (including Taiwan), Korea and South Asia, presenting them as depicted objects, while taking Japan itself as a unique entity.

³⁶ This ideological association of Lamarck's name was stigmatized by the extreme cases of the Kammerer and Lysenko affairs that had less to do with Lamarck himself than with the political appropriation of Lamarck's ideas. In 1926, the Austrian biologist Paul Kammerer, or his assistant, injected India ink under the "midwife" toad's skin and presented it as evidence of the inheritance of acquired characters. It was soon discovered to be a forgery and thereafter Kammerer shot himself. For Lysenko's political endorsement of the slogan of inheritance of acquired characters and the Russian eugenics movement, see Mark Adams' "Eugenics in Russia, 1900-1940," in *The Wellborn Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 153-216.

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

This twofold imaging of the Japanese national-character discourse stemmed from the framework of the mutually exclusive binarics *chūgoku/iteki*, civilization/barbarian, and inner (*na*)/outer (*ga*), as it had since the Tokugawa period, when China functioned as the “Other” to help define the Japanese “self.”³⁷ Later, from the Meiji era on, the representation of a monolithic West took over the previous function of China to help mirror for the Japanese their own essence of indigenous culture. On the other hand, China, through the *Tōyōshi* (Japan's Orient) apparatus,³⁸ was represented as an Orientalist “other” in the shaping of Japanese “self” from the compounding of various binary parts such as East/West, spirit/material, art/science, traditional/modern, past/future into a composite synthesis which was believed to be a realization of the best of East and West by 1920s cosmopolitanist thinkers. Later, in the trend of culturalism of the 1930s, as Tetsuo Najita and Harry Harootunian point out, “[t]he recognition of having achieved this unprecedented synthesis validated the subsequent belief that Japan was uniquely qualified to assume leadership in Asia.”³⁹ If Japan had reached new levels of achievement that no single Western nation ever had, then how did the Japanese eugenicists present their case that there was still room for racial improvement?

In the decade of the 1920s, the eugenicists' presentation of the need for eugenic measures in Japan was initially derived from a series of political and economic concerns. For instance, Tanaka Yoshimaro (1884-1972), the director of the Japanese Genetics Association, wrote in 1924,

Germany was once one of the world's super-powers before World War I, but now becomes poor and bankrupt. Like Germany, Japan, formerly strong and rich, now suffers economic recession after the Great Earthquake of 1923. The depreciation of the Japanese currency is so devastating that Japan is treated by other countries as a second-rate nation. However, due to the fact that the fundamental qualities of the Japanese people are still intact and prevail in the

³⁷ Harry D. Harootunian, “The Functions of China in Tokugawa Thought” in *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, ed. by Akira Iriye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 9-36.

³⁸ See Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California, 1993).

³⁹ Tetsuo Najita and Harry Harootunian, “Japanese Revolt Against the West: Political and Cultural Criticism in the Twentieth Century” in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol. 6, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 712.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

new generations, it is an extremely pressing need to devise a fundamental measure to safeguard the excellent qualities of the Japanese race in the face of future political and economic upheavals.⁴⁰

In 1925, he contested the Americans' eugenic claim that Japanese immigrants would debase the American racial quality. He saw that this anti-Japanese sentiment in the Immigration Act was rather driven by political and economic interests opposed to the Asian minority. He defended the view that the fundamental quality of the Japanese people was never inferior to that of the Americans. Even though generally the Japanese physical constitution and facial appearance could not compete with those of Americans, these two features were less relevant in the fundamental concerns of eugenics. The nature of the immigration problem was rather seen as individual; in other words, Tanaka redirected the point of the question to be what kind of Japanese individuals immigrated into the United States. Before being able to answer this question, Tanaka solicited support for the establishment of a genetic research institute in order to conduct a thorough investigation of such an important issue.⁴¹

Another central figure of the eugenics movement was Ikeda Shigenori (1892-1966). A journalist who later studied Nazi medicine in Germany and became a full-time devoted movement leader, Ikeda proposed in 1928 that the goals for the movement were to promote the Japanese race as in the first rank of the world, and to safeguard its leadership in the human culture. In order to achieve these goals, not only should the knowledge of eugenics be popularized, but a social reform should also be implemented to improve the mental and physical constitution of the Japanese people, so as to raise the spirit of self-government and enforce the disciplining project of citizenship. Ikeda perceived that the gist of the eugenics movement was based on the five guidelines expressed in the

⁴⁰ Tanaka's article "Ningen honshitsu no kaisen ga kyumu (A pressing need for the improvement of human qualities)" was quoted in Suzuki Zenji, *Nihon no yuseigaku: so no sishô to undô no kaiseki* (Japanese eugenics: its ideas and locus of movement) (Tokyo: Sankyô, 1983), p. 101.

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

Imperial Rescript on Education (*Kyōiku ni kansuru chokugo*) promulgated in 1890.⁴² According to Carol Gluck's analysis,

[The Rescript on Education] consisted of a Mito school beginning, which linked *kokutai* (national polity, a personified embodiment in the emperor system) with loyalty and filiality; a Confucian center, which enumerated the virtues that inform private and public human relationships, adding a modern injunction to civil obedience and national sacrifice; and an imperial ending, which made the emperor the source of a morality that was said to be both indigenous and universal at the same time.⁴³

Identifying with the nationalist trajectory set out by the Rescript on Education, Ikeda overcame the eugenicists' dilemma of how to remain "Japanese" in the process of racial improvement. Moreover, Ikeda saw the eugenics movement as the most effective means to preserve the national traits (*minzokusei*) and national spirit (*minzokukon*).⁴⁴

In the 1930s, we can see a rhetorical emphasis in their presentation showing much confidence in the "Japanese race." Using the metaphor of "jade burnishing,"⁴⁵ Nagai Hisomu, the chairman of the Japanese Racial Hygiene Association, advocated the need for eugenics for the Japanese race. He unraveled the dilemma of Japanese-ness and racial improvement with the following statement:

As much as environment acts on the species, education is surely important to the human being. Nonetheless, it is absurd to think that one can burnish and make shine a tile in order to turn it into a jade. This is the poignant truth we learn from modern genetics. It is man's body and life, offspring, family, country that constitute what man is. It is Galton's hand to wake us up about the fundamental problem for man's future...Recently, there is a national appeal for arousing the Japanese Spirit and the glory of national polity (*kokutai*). If the nation of Japan were considered in a concrete sense

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 102.

⁴² Ibid., p. 115.

⁴³ Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 120-121.

⁴⁴ Suzuki Zenji, *Nihon no yuseigaku*, p. 116.

⁴⁵ This metaphor was also used by another eugenicist, Gotō Ryūkiji, who established the journal *Yūseigaku* (Eugenics monthly) in 1924, in his article "Yūseigaku to wa don na gakumon ka" (What kind of knowledge is eugenics?) in *Yūseigaku*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1926), pp. 17-19.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

of "the Japanese people," in order to devote our loyalty to the nation and filial piety to the ancestors, we should sustain and protect this national body which was shaped and formed through a series of cultural assimilation processes and military campaigns for two thousand and six hundred years. No other races and nations have reached such a glorious historical achievement and maintained such longevity. Our veins convey valuable hereditary elements descended from our ancestors that we have to examine, protect and extend with the knowledge of Racial Hygiene (*minzoku eiseigaku*). In order to awaken a distinct sense of Japaneseness in the nation of Japan, from now on, nobody can refuse the task of reviving the Japanese Spirit and the national body. Aiming at this particular goal, we contributed our individual efforts to the establishment of the Japanese Racial Hygiene Association [in 1930]. We now need everyone's pledge to this campaign.⁴⁶

Inspired by his predecessors, scholars like Ogyû Sorai (1666-1728), Kamo no Mabuchi (1697-1769), Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) and Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843), who did not discard the valuable essential qualities of Japanese culture in the face of cultural domination of Confucianism from China, Nagai expounded the goal of biology and other natural sciences as a support for the unique Japanese national polity. Like Ikeda, Nagai's position on the application of eugenics not only transcended the question of how to retain "Japaneseness" in the eugenic project, but also reversed the racial hierarchy imposed by western social Darwinism through a celebration of the glorious historical continuity that no other race or culture had ever achieved.⁴⁷ The historical continuity of the Japanese "*kokutai*" was the best evidence of natural selection of "survival of the fittest."

Such a positing of the supremacy of "the Japanese race" was not plausible in the Chinese context, since the Chinese national character was depicted as decadent and degenerated by May Fourth Era intellectuals such as Lu Xun and Yu Dafu.⁴⁸ If the relationship between eugenics and the national character was figuratively like a vitamin supplement given to a healthy person in the

⁴⁶ Nagai Hisomu, *Yûseigaku gairon* (Tokyo: Yusanko, 1936), pp. 4-5.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁸ See Lung-Kei Sun, "The Presence of the Fin-de-Siècle in the May Fourth Era" in *Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1996), pp. 194-209.

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

Japanese eugenicists' presentation, then in the Chinese case it would be rather like remedies given to a "sick man of the East (*dongya bingfu*)."⁴⁹

In 1929 and 1933-35, Pan Guangdan translated and published respectively Ellsworth Huntington's four chapters on the Chinese character in *The Character of Races* and Arthur H. Smith's fifteen chapters in *Chinese Characteristics*. Pan later included both works in his book *Minzu texing yu minzu weisheng* (1937, National character and racial hygiene). Different from the previous Chinese rendition of Arthur Smith's work from the Japanese translation, Pan selected fifteen of the twenty-seven chapters of the entire book and reorganized them in his own sequence of physiological and psychological, economic, and social categories. After he juxtaposed the translation of Smith's and Huntington's works, Pan also included three chapters of his own writing. The introductory chapter was a critique of contemporary discourse on the themes of "nation (*minzu*)," "national character (*minzu texing*)," and "national revival (*minzu fuxing*)." The fourth chapter was on the symptoms of national diseases (*minzu bingxiang*), while the fifth chapter discussed the prospect of racial hygiene. In this reorganized work, Pan suggested to his Chinese readers that through the mirrored image

⁴⁹ According to Rebecca E. Karl's posting on the listserv H-Asia in September, 1997, in the 15 Dec. 1896 issue of the *Shiwu bao*, an essay from the *Zilin xibao* [North China Daily News] was reprinted; it proclaimed that there were "four sick people of the world"—Turkey, Persia, China, Morocco (*Tianxia sibingren*). Shortly after, these were whittled down to two and renamed. This was in a preface written by Liang Qichao to a book on the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, which was also published independently as an essay in the 51st issue of the *Shiwu bao* (entitled: "E Tu zhangji xu"). Liang states that "Westerners often say that there are two sick men of the East: China and Turkey." He goes on to describe, in the context of exhorting people to care about foreign affairs, what this means for Turkey and for China. He says that Turkey, "previously a big and powerful country" spanning 3 continents, today "has become like a strand of hair that has nearly snapped." What prevents it from snapping, Liang says, is European preoccupation with the second sick man of the East, China. Also in the beginning of 1898 in his book eventually submitted as a memorial to the throne during the 100-days reform, Kang Youwei wrote that Europe regards China as the "Turkey of the East." (In his *Tujue xiaoru ji* [Demise and Weakening of Turkey]: "tujue" here is used to refer to the Ottoman Turks.) Other Western newspapers in Shanghai also frequently used the locution in reference to the Chinese—the missionary journal? "Wanguo gongbao" is another prime source of this locution. With time, Turkey was sometimes dropped from the locution, and China stood alone as 'sick man of the East'. This may also have been reinforced from/in Japan, but its genealogy seems more clear via the Western/ Turkey connection.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

reflected from these two foreign experts' writing one could come to grips with the characteristic symptoms of the Chinese people.⁵⁰

The symptoms of the Chinese national character, Pan observed, can be divided into five aspects – cultural, social, economic, physical and the will for survival – which were based on their contrast with an ideal healthy nation that has rejuvenating cultural creativity, facile adaptability, robust physical constitution and invincible will for survival. Culturally, Chinese creativity had been vastly diminishing, especially seen in the poor performance on Ministry of Education general examinations in mathematics, foreign language (English), physics and chemistry at the primary and secondary school level. Unlike Japan, in the domain of overseas education there were pitifully few Chinese students attracted to the fields of science and technology. This deficiency of interest, according to Pan, was not necessarily due to a lack of scientific education, but was perhaps a demonstration of inherent incapability. At this point of time, China had undergone for three decades or so various social reforms promoted by different generations of returned students who received their overseas education from different countries. However, none of the reforms could synthesize the best parts of these manifold fashionable ideas, and come forth with suitable policy. Pan commented that this failure was another indication of inadequate creativity.

Socially, Pan continued, there had been no well-organized structure in the society to hold up the various social forces in the face of the political disintegration of recent decades. Bureaucratic inefficiency was a prevailing syndrome, from the top level of the national government, all the way down to the administrative organ in small regional schools. Even the overseas Chinese had the same problem in that the Japanese colonizers in Southeast Asia easily outcompeted Chinese enterprises in

⁵⁰ See the prefaces by Li Jinghan and Pan Guangdan himself to his own book, *Minzu texing yu minzu weisheng*, originally published by the Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1937, now collected in the Pan's Collection, (Beijing: Beida, 1995), volume 3, pp. 5-26. The term "mirror" was used by Li Jinghan, a renowned sociologist, in his preface.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

their "Marching Southward" movement. China did have strong social organizations such as kinship, guild, and old-fashioned village and secret societies, whose networks were based on their particular interests, but none of these could transform into an impartial political organization. In view of incessant internal sociopolitical chaos, China was very vulnerable to foreign invasion.

Economically, Chinese industrialization was far underdeveloped. Lack of creativity and of organization were two of the main reasons for the inadequate means of production. In addition, the most weighty shortcoming, as mentioned in both Arthur H. Smith's and Ellsworth Huntington's works, was the "selfishness" rooted in the Chinese national character. Selfishness proliferated official corruption, and promoted the two extreme aberrations of avarice and profligacy, which contributed to an uneven distribution of social wealth. Although Chinese people were diligent hard-workers, they were not able to increase productivity without efficient management.

In terms of physical constitution and vitality, Chinese, like Jews, were said to have a high capacity to endure in or evade any unfavorable environment. For instance, Chinese emigrants were all over world, surviving from cold to tropical zones. From Pan's writing of various historical migrations from North to South China, his denotation of "Chinese" was certainly Han Chinese. Despite their high death rate, Chinese could also resist various kinds of diseases such as yellow fever, malaria and tuberculosis, more so than other people who might have been devastated by diseases turned into disastrous epidemics. From an unnamed source, Pan made another example of the Chinese ability to resist syphilis, in that Chinese did not suffer as much as the Whites the attack on the nervous system in the tertiary stage. The Chinese ability to endure, like sticky candy, was said to be so flexible that most Chinese people were seemingly patient and indifferent to their suffering from harsh surroundings. Some intellectuals characterized this endurance and contentment with temporary ease as survival skills, and considered them positive characteristics of the Chinese infantry. However, in the milieu of ruthless international competition, Pan did not take them as an evidence of

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

“the survival of the fittest.” Pan believed that there was plenty of room to improve the Chinese physique, not necessarily through external physical education and athletics movement, but rather fundamentally from a genetic buildup.

Pan criticized that, although Chinese had strenuous will as seen from the above example of frontier migration and settlement, they were only selfishly concerned with their individual or lineage propagation, without thinking about the nation as a group unit for survival. In addition, Chinese did not have any desire to glorify their national life, celebrate heroic spirit or venture into the untrodden world. After a series of foreign invasions, opium, civil wars, anti-superstition campaigns, and custom-reform campaigns, the Chinese people had learned how to manage barely to survive. The Chinese national spirit, Pan judged, was exhausted and decaying.⁵¹

Pan's representation of symptoms in the Chinese national character resonated with the May Fourth critique on cultural decadence and racial degeneration of the Chinese national character. The May Fourth intellectuals tended to present the Chinese civilization and physique as overripe and declining. Chen Duxiu, using the metaphor of new and old cells for the youth and old, saw in China that the new and lively cells had been infected by the “virus” of the old and decaying ones. He said, “When I look at our youth, five out of ten are young in age but senile in body, nay, nine out of ten are young in age and body, but senile in their brain nerves.”⁵² In the same fashion, Lu Xun criticized, “Chinese males and females tend to age ahead of their time; before they reach twenty, they are already senescent.”⁵³ Thanks to this degeneration discourse, eugenic ideas became a possible source of inspiration for national salvation and started to gain increased attention from the public. For Pan Guangdan, eugenics would be the key to regenerate the race and nation. For Lu Xun and Chen Duxiu, the only outlet for rejuvenating the old decaying civilization was to revive its “instinct,” or

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 178-203.

⁵² Lung-Kee Sun, “The Presence of the Fin-de-Siècle in the May Fourth Era,” p. 202.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

search among beastly barbarians for new blood. The historian Gu Jiegang (1893-1980) furthered the gist of this representation and stated that the corruption of Chinese civilization needed to be rescued by the fresh energy of its primitive and virile neighbors. Chinese history had shown that in the South-North division epoch (420-581), the Five Dynasties epoch (907-960), and the Yuan (1206-1341) and Qing (1644-1911), China had received infusions of fresh blood.⁵⁴

However, there was a nuance of difference between Pan Guangdan's and the May Fourth representations. Whereas Lu Xun and Chen Duxiu saw feminization and senility in the Chinese civilization and physique, Pan was not gloomily pessimistic and proposed that the Chinese nation, instead of being aged, was still in its youth. Using the anthropological study of Griffith Taylor's *Environment and Race* (1927), Pan maintained that the Latin peoples were the oldest races, with the Teutons second and the Slavs third. The Chinese people were historically mixed by various races, some old and some young, but compared with the Latins as old-aged, and the Teutons and the Slavs as middle-aged, Chinese were still youthful. Pan explained that, viewing the Chinese people as a sickly youth struggling to grow up into a strong mature man, he gave the eugenics journal he established in April, 1932 – right after *Yousheng Yuekan* (Eugenics Monthly) was discontinued – the name “*Huanian*,” an abbreviation from the phrase of helping the Chinese nation to reach maturity.

On the one hand he affirmed that there was enormous stamina (元氣, *Yuanqi*, a term having a genetic or prenatal connotations) in the Chinese nation. On the other hand, he felt obliged to admit that China had received a corrupting influence from certain historical negative selection in its childhood, and that its genetic constitution was now suffering various pathological symptoms. In order to restore it to its original health, Pan advocated that a social device of cultural and natural

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ See Laurence A. Schneider, *Ku Chieh-kang and China's New History: Nationalism and the Quest for Alternative Traditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 263-269. Gu, from the late 1920s, emphasized the

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

selection based on eugenic principles should be implemented as soon as possible. If Japan could become a great nation like Turkey, Italy and Germany, Pan believed that surely China could do it as well.

Pan's nationalistic expression of Chinese national character, and his presentation of eugenic proposals in wrestling with the dilemma between the Social Darwinian racial hierarchy and national identity, were recast and shaped by the materiality and intellectual discourses of that period. As Pan's best friend Li Jinghan remarked in the preface to Pan's book, one can improve oneself only through self-critique and self-knowledge. Pan had to strategically present cultural critiques in order to promote eugenics as a hopeful tool to help China survive in the relentless competition, whereas the Japanese eugenicists had transcended the dilemma and reversed the racial hierarchy before the implementation of eugenics.

Interestingly, none of the Japanese and Chinese eugenic presentations of symptoms belonged to the categories of genetic traits, but were rather phenotypic traits developed from cycles of cultural and environmental influences. Hence, they could unplug the impasse between national identity and inherent inferiority. Cultural critiques as such, their diagnoses and prescribed remedies set forth in the subsequent debates merged both Lamarckian (hygienic) and Mendelian (eugenic) approaches. In the outcome of the social debates and representation, Japanese eugenicists and hygienists involved the State as the field for their legal proposition and implementation. The State hence became the nation-state as an analogously sublimated form of the human body. Upon such a form the evolutionary force could manifest itself in the change from ignorance to enlightenment, from shamanistic superstition to sanitation, from treatment to prevention, from prolonging life to enriching life, and from the savagery to civilization. In order to function and achieve perfect

potential physical contributions of non-Han people, and became interested in their future role in Chinese civilization. Pan's position of inter-ethnic marriage and his shift to ethnological studies of minorities was similar to Gu's.

Chung, Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics

physiological harmony, the nation-state as an organism would coordinate various organs in a time of peace, while in a time of turmoil it would defend its life (the majority's *civis*) and forsake individual ones.⁵⁵ It was this very principle of totality – of forsaking individual life and subsuming it into a meaningful whole – that brought forth the historical synthesis of individual body and social body into the national/racial body embracing the approaches both of public hygiene and of racial hygiene.

The role of Lamarckism as a cultural logic playing in the Japanese context helped provide an analogous extension from the individual body to a greater national/racial body, in that undesirable elements were justifiably removable for the sake of the wellbeing and health of *zentai* (totality or literally the body as a whole). The irony implied herein was the removal of leftist socialism, like the eradication of leprosy, by the rightist socialists on the basis of the same Lamarckian emphasis. Hence, the mind in the *zentai* body, manifested as the state operating in the nation, became a homogenizing unity to coordinate harmoniously on everybody's part. In comparison, the Mendelian approach in Chinese eugenics was not only vilified by socialists of both the left and right, but also was transformed and succumbed to the concern of generational transmission in the Chinese cultural body. The shift of attention directed Chinese eugenics down the route of cultural renaissance and rejuvenation, rather than the route to eugenics bills legislation.

The outcomes of debates in both the Japanese and the Chinese eugenics movements: whereas the Japanese had achieved and exhibited efficiency in the unity of mind and body, the Chinese were debating how to put together a healthy cultural body, with the function of its mind still in question. The social debates of eugenics not only sheds light on the social forces in action in Japan and China, but also alerts us that the politics of scientific interpretation is often involved in the struggle over meaning and values, and that the politics of eugenics was not a mere conservative or rightist phenomenon.

⁵⁵ Gotô Shimpei, "Kokka cisci genri" in *Kagaku no shisô*, II (Tokyo: Chimaku shobô, 1964), pp. 289-303.

Quantity over Quality—Survivors as the Fittest

One crucial test to define the fittest, according to Herbert Spencer's conception of evolution, was warfare. He said, "Warfare among men, like warfare among animals, has had a large share in raising their organizations to a higher stage." First, it had the effect of extirpating races which were least fit to cope with the conditions of their existence, and exterminating relatively feeble tribes, tribes relatively wanting in endurance, or courage, or sagacity, or the power of cooperation. Warfare thus tended to maintain the life-preserving powers possessed by men. Second, the average advance caused by destruction of the least-developed races and the least-developed individuals was inheritable, thus providing a base for further development. Third, it stimulated technological development in responding to the imperative demands of war. Fourth, it brought forward the formation of large societies and brought about a social aggregation which furthered the development of industrialization, and during this stage of development war was no longer advantageous.⁵⁶

The Spencerian presentation of warfare illuminated by the fourth stage of development did not necessarily contradict the usual theory of eugenicists who saw warfare as a matter of individual selection. For instance, in a major speech in 1935 Hitler, echoing the influential Nazi racial hygienist Alfred Ploetz, warned that "every war goes against the selection of the fittest." This is because the

⁵⁶ Herbert Spencer, *On Social Evolution—Selected Writings*, ed. by J. D. Peel, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 168-169. This selection was excerpted partially from Spencer's various works, *Social Statics*, *The Study of Sociology* and *Principles of Sociology*.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

best stock of men of large physique and strong constitution tended to be put on the front lines, while the worst ones tended to suffer least from war, going on to proliferate with their own progeny.⁵⁷

The Spencerian evolutionary conception of warfare was embraced by both the Japanese and the Chinese in their confrontation of the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), in that both perceived the War as a progression (J. *shinka*, C. *jinhua*) from a war of individual heroes and armed forces to a war of total mobilization.⁵⁸ Scientists in general and eugenicists in particular participated willingly in designing social policies as part of the war strategy, advancing technology, and most importantly, enrolling as role models of morality in the Spencerian forms of endurance, courage, sagacity and cooperation which they saw as key standards for the survival of the fittest race.

The Japanese state and eugenicists justified their imperialist expansion into Manchuria and China proper as a natural outcome of population growth. The geneticist Komai Taku voiced the notion of Japanese racial superiority and defended his participation in Japanese campaigns surveying natural resources in Southeast Asia as an aid to local development and to the Japanese leadership in the region, in their resistance to Western encroachment. Another geneticist Tanaka Yoshimaro considered racial hygiene an appropriate method of war preparation and national participation. The renowned entomologist Matsumura Shōnen (1872-1960) advocated the analogous connection between species and nations in their competition for survival, and affirmed the War as not only inevitable but also necessary for future progress in his plea for "National Awakening."⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Ploetz was taken seriously enough to be once nominated for a Nobel Prize. His eugenics ideas were often appropriated by Hitler and the Japanese eugenicists as well. See Robert N. Proctor, *Racial Hygiene—Medicine under Nazi*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 28-29.

⁵⁸ This evolutionary idea of the war of total mobilization was especially pronounced by the publication endorsed by the Japanese Kōmei Cabinet, *Kokka sodoin* (National mobilization), (Tokyo: Kokufukai, 1937), pp. 86-92.

⁵⁹ See Matsumura's article, "Minzoku no kakusei" originally published in *Bunge shunfū*, (1933), no. 11 and the critique of Matsumura's article by an anonymous Marxist biologist has been included in the collection *Nippon kagaku gizyutusi taike*, (Tokyo: Daiichi hōki shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1964-72), vol. 15, pp. 413-415. Komai's article, "Dai-Tōa sensō to idengaku (The Greater East Asia War and Genetics)" and Tanaka's "Sensō to idengaku (War and Genetics)" also included in the same volume, pp. 409-411.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

The Chinese eugenicist Pan Guangdan accepted the second Sino-Japanese War as an opportunity to test the Chinese national stamina (*minzu yuanti*) or vitality (*minzu huoli*) by the evaluation of two indices, the quantity and the quality of population. The test represented a threshold, which Pan applauded through the metaphor of a coming-of-age ceremony: a young adult grows into his manhood, a necessary part of the process involving the ritual of suffering hardship in war. Pan said that from the War, the Chinese had learned to know their merits and demerits, and had adapted them into a strategy of guerrilla warfare and war of attrition.⁶⁰ Pan Guangdan and the Japanese eugenicists enthusiastically joined in the war effort and the test of the survival of the fittest. Here, we notice a split signification of the fittest and the survivors in the shift from value neutrality to enthusiasm. This shift was not merely a unique event for China and Japan, but a transnational phenomenon. The global expansion of eugenics technology encountered different local interests as war became the outcome of conflicting interests in the larger setting of World War Two.

The second Sino-Japanese War functioned as a crucial push for the political implementation of the eugenics project in Japan and the establishment of the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1938 to serve the need for "healthy citizens, healthy soldiers." The Ministry not only took up the objectives of the Racial Hygiene Association, but also sponsored the draft of the National Eugenics Bill. The Ministry also worked closely with eugenicists who did research on the Taiwanese, Korean, and Manchurian populations. Japan's population then was 73 million and China's 470 million, and Japan's birth rate had dropped from 36.2% in 1920 to 26.7% in 1937 as a result of the birth-control movement. As such, the Ministry as part of the wartime system was responsible for meeting the qualitative and quantitative demand for drafted soldiers, in order to sustain Japan's leadership

⁶⁰ Pan Guangdan, "Kangzhan de minzu yiyi" in his *Yousheng yu kangzhan* (Eugenics and the anti-Japanese war), (Chongqing: Shangwu shuju, 1944), pp. 67-72.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

throughout East Asia. The Ministry adopted both qualitative and quantitative approaches in the design of population policy.

Qualitatively, the improvement of the Japanese race was based on the eugenics programs and supplemented by marriage counseling and coordination of the various organizations that would help in arranging marriages. Quantitatively, in order to increase the already-declining birth rate, the Ministry in 1941 tried to lower the average marriage age by three years over the course of the next decade, and set as a goal an average of five children per family with the encouragement of tax exemption, loans, rationing privileges, etc.⁶¹ Overseas, the eugenicists had to juggle the management of human resources in the Japanese colonies, Taiwan and Korea, where we find that the eugenic qualitative approach was intriguingly absent and conversely present was the Japanese *kōminka* movement of “making the Taiwanese and Koreans true Japanese.”⁶²

On January 22, 1941, the Ministry promulgated, based on the decision of a Cabinet meeting, the “Outlines of Establishment of Population Policy.” It responded to the fears, expressed by the press, that the colonized populations might not help the war effort wholeheartedly. Therefore Japan had to design a population policy for the home country that would improve the Japanese population in both quality and quantity in order to insure its national security and leadership in East Asia.⁶³ The Outlines abstracted the goals above and gave instructions for specific objectives, focusing mostly on the Japanese archipelago. Quantitatively, the plan targeted the increase of the homeland population

⁶¹ John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), pp. 270-1.

⁶² The *kōminka* movement included a national-language movement, a name-changing program, a military recruitment campaign, and reforms of native religions and social customs. See Chou Wan-yao, “The Kōminka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations” in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, ed. Peter Duus et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 40-68. Among these campaigns of spiritual transformation, one finds that the most obvious approach—assimilation via interbreeding between the colonizer and the colonized—was missing. The Japanese Kōseiishō-sponsored National Eugenics Bill did not include Taiwan and other colonies for implementation. This intriguing phenomenon is critically examined by Oguma Eiji in *Tan'itsu minzoku shintai no kigen*, pp. 235-270.

⁶³ This concern was expressed in an editorial pledge in the *Yomiuri shinbun* (Yomiuri Newspaper) on July 4, 1939, and this editorial article was included in the *Kōseiishō nijunen shi*, p. 222.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

to a total of 100 million in the year 1960; hence the Ministry encouraged reproduction of each couple up to an average of five births. It proposed reducing tax on parents, providing prenatal care, subsidizing medical and educational expenses, and for larger families, granting public awards and military ration. Abortion and birth control were to be absolutely prohibited. Other public hygiene and health plans were proposed in order to reduce the mortality rate. Qualitatively, the Ministry intended to spread evenly the population over urban and rural areas, propagate eugenic ideas, and impose physical and mental training on urban youths.⁶⁴

In China, Pan Guangdan echoed Chiang Kai-shek's campaign of spiritual mobilization in August, 1939, appealing to all gentry and educators in both the free and occupied areas to help lead local people to resist Japanese rule and manage regional autonomy and financial wellbeing. He added two basic conditions, including a minimum of material resources to meet people's basic needs, and a cleanup of corruption, without which there would remain many Japanese collaborators and submissive imperial subjects among the Chinese population, and Chiang's campaign would not achieve the goal of resistance against the Japanese.⁶⁵ Pan even encouraged those people who lived in the occupied areas to immigrate to the Great Rear areas, namely Free China in the Southwest, to rid themselves of Japanese control. Pan considered immigrants superior to local permanent residents, who were used to stability and submissively accepted what was given, that is, the Japanese puppet regime. A successful immigrant, Pan argued, possessed at least three indispensable qualities: personal drive, a persevering and risk-taking physique, and intelligent competence as he passed the test of survival. Pan enumerated various historical movements of ethnic migrations and the Han Chinese settlement from the North to the South, to support his view on the vitality of immigrants. He also cited foreign historical examples of the Anglo-Saxon immigrants' establishment of the United States,

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*; the Outlines are listed in pp. 216-218.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 114-119.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Most significantly, Pan commented on the Jewish immigrants expelled by the German Nazis as a great loss for Germany and a gain for the USA, because of the superior qualities of immigrants such as Albert Einstein. As Pan perceived the anti-Japanese war as a survival test, he believed that immigrants who moved to the Great Rear were born to be tough fighters for any unfavorable environment and a replenishing source for the doughty soldiers. As for those who did not migrate to the Southwest and yet joined the anti-Japanese guerrillas in the occupied areas, they also displayed the immigrants' qualities.⁶⁶

The same bulk of Chinese population that both the Japanese and Chinese eugenicists tried to win over, played a decisive role in the Sino-Japanese war when, in the first few years, China had to fight alone the better-equipped and well-deployed Japanese army. As the distinguished Chinese general He Yingqin argued, because the firepower of one Japanese division was four times stronger than its Chinese counterpart,⁶⁷ the main resource the Chinese had to depend on was its vast population. In the initial stage of military engagement with the Japanese army, Mao Zedong had upheld a strategy of a war of attrition. On March 29, 1938, Chiang promulgated the Outlines for a war of resistance and national reconstruction, with which he confirmed a "mass line" approach of popular mobilization and guerrilla war tactics.

In the fall of 1941, the Central Statistics Bureau of the Nationalist government invited the renowned sociologist and demographer Chen Da to sketch a population-survey plan for Kunming and the Great Rear areas in order to obtain accurate household information for conscription. Around the same time, Chen Da was appointed as a member of the Population Policy Research Committee in the newly established Social Ministry in the Executive Yuan. The Committee included Chen's colleagues at Xinan Lianda (Southwest University), the eugenicist Pan Guangdan, the

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-86.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugemics*

sociologists Li Jinghan and Wu Zelin into a Kunming team in conjunction with another team formed in Chongqing. The Committee suggested in its second meeting in March, 1942, the establishment of a marriage-counseling bureau and healthcare centers in order to secure the quality of births. The Committee also recommended legislation or a decree to impose marriage restriction on mental patients and the feeble-minded. At the third meeting in Kunming with the same group of specialists, the Committee decided to add several implementation plans including a population survey and statistics, and attempts to increase the frontier population, elevate living standards, prohibit abortion, and promote social life between men and women.⁶⁸ In the meantime, the Kunming team convened twice with the one in Chongqing in order to reach a consensus for the guidelines on population policy drafted mainly by Chen Da and Pan Guangdan. In the two joint meetings with the Chongqing team, there were some disputes between the Committee and the Nationalist party members over the guidelines. These disputes included: 1. Some party members insisted dogmatically on their understanding of Sun Yat-sen's strategic promotion of population growth as a permanent unlimited expansion. Chen Da suggested the compromising term of "rational increase" to settle this dispute. 2. Based on the above misunderstanding, some party members disagreed with the birth-control plan; therefore, the term "birth control" would not appear in the guideline, but it was incorporated in the implementation blueprint. 3. In the Fifth National Assembly of the Nationalist Party, one senior party member objected to the stipulation of sexual education, but the Committee insisted on its fundamental necessity and importance in the plan. As a result, the stipulation was merely modified by different wording. On May 5, 1945, the Guideline of National Population Policy (*minzu baoyu zhengce gangling*) was passed in the Sixth National Assembly of the Nationalist Party.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Ishijima Noriyuki, "Kô-Nichi sensô" in *Taimei: Nihon gendaishi* (Tokyo: Nihon hyôronsha, 1979), vol. 2, pp. 186-231, especially, p. 187.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 443-444.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 445.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

In this guideline, the eugenics principle of preventing the proliferation of defective elements was eventually incorporated. In order to safeguard eugenic quality, the methods of premarital examination, venereal-disease prevention, and the separation or sterilization of hereditarily defective people were adopted. Moreover, the guideline increased several articles such as the prohibition of abortion, infanticide, concubinage, abduction and human trafficking; helping increase the frontier population by implementing public health, educational facilities, industrialization and environmental improvement, and most intriguingly by encouraging interracial and interethnic marriage in order to strengthen national unity and provide human resources for military conscription.⁷⁰ This particular feature of interethnic and interracial marriage encouragement formed a sharp contrast with the Japanese population policy. For the eugenicist Pan Guangdan and his sociologist colleagues, the anti-Japanese war, like its numerous historical precedents of war, drove a large-scale migration of the Han population to the West and Southwest that would rejuvenate racial vitality or, in Pan's own terms, "racial stamina" of the Han Chinese.

Conclusion—Views from Two Eugenicists

After the eight-year Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese eugenicist Nagai Hisomu who spent one year in Taipei and seven years in Beijing was expatriated back to Tokyo. Meanwhile, the Chinese Pan Guangdan returned to Tsinghua University in Beijing when the Xinan Lianda, the wartime associated Southwest University, was disbanded and its faculty returned to their prewar institutions. Whereas Japan was occupied temporarily by the United States in 1945-52, China was plagued again by the civil war between the Nationalist party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist party (CCP) from 1945 to 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek's troops were defeated and the Nationalist regime was forced

⁷⁰ Long Guanghai, *Zhongguo renkou*, appendix, pp. 1-7.

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

to retreat to Taiwan. In Japan, the title of the National Eugenics Bill was changed into the Eugenics Protective Bill in 1948. Between 1941 and 1945, 192 men and 243 women received sterilization surgery based on the Kōseishō's Eugenics Bill, while it was estimated that 8,820 men and 6,399 women were yet to be sterilized on the waiting list. In China, since the domestic turmoil of the civil war and the Nationalist regime's relocation to Taiwan in 1949, the implementation and legal enforcement of the Guideline of National Population Policy was disrupted.

It seems ironic that the eugenicists returned to their original and more autonomous position prior to the War, and condemned war as a dysgenic mechanism. After returning to Japan in 1945, Nagai reflected in 1946 on the failure of the War, which he regarded as a divine punishment caused by several ambitious warlords who ignored the scientific spirit and depended on the suicidal Kamikaze spirit. In the long-enduring war of attrition, the Japanese warlords suicidally dispatched all the best stock of Japanese soldiers to the battlefield, leaving the weak and inferior ones at home, where they married and unexpectedly procreated problematical offspring. Consequently, the War, in Nagai's opinion, had promoted socially deleterious selection in the Japanese population.

As for Pan Guangdan, he transformed his wartime sympathetic attitude toward ethnic minorities, and eugenic interest in understanding the genetic makeup of the Han Chinese as a grand racial and ethnic fusion, into a cultural critique of Sinocentric nationalism or Han chauvinism. He saw nationalism and imperialism as two sides of one coin which had been epitomized in racial supremacy by the Japanese empire and Hitler's fascist expansion. He reflected that although China was not able to become an imperialist power, it was nonetheless ingrained with Han chauvinism expressed in every historical treatment of ethnic minorities. Traditionally, expressions of Han chauvinism included military conquest and suppression, and cultural sinification that bound ethnic tribal kingdoms with feudal kinship, the Confucian five ethics, self-delegated moral superiority and a tributary system. After the Republican Revolution, Sun Yat-sen's ideal of ethnic autonomy and

Chung, *Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics*

peaceful coexistence was never materialized by the Republican government. Pan critiqued that the Republican government, even though changing to a different name for administration, followed de facto their historical precedent of politically subjugating and culturally dominating ethnic minorities. This unfulfilled ideal of ethnic equality and autonomy, Pan believed, awaited the liberating force of the People's Revolution postulated in Maoism and Lenin-Marxism. Pan's sympathy towards the CCP and his political enthusiasm to organize an independent party in the midst of the civil war between the CCP and KMT, made him the most wanted target after the KMT assassinated Pan's political allies Li Gongpu and the talented poet Wen Yiduo.

In 1952, Pan switched from the discipline of sociology at Tsinghua University to the Central College of Ethnology, where he devoted his career to the study of minority cultures. He was politically accused as a rightist reactionary by Meng Ming and Huang Dongsen in 1957 for his earlier promotion of eugenics via affirmative recognition of the traditional selection mechanisms of filial piety, familism, matchmaking of equal socio-economic standing, and an examination system. The chief reason for the attack on Pan was his opposition to Lysenkoism. In 1939 Pan had rejected the theories of genetic inheritance of acquired characters promoted by Paul Kammerer (a German geneticist invited to Russia for research) and Ivan Pavlov under the dogmatic influence of Stalinism.⁷¹ In 1967, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, Pan was tortured to death because of his politically incorrect theories.

⁷¹ Pan, *Yousheng yu kangzhan*, pp. 41-42.